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Ramsey Pricing

For simplicity, suppose that the demand functions for the n produced goods (q1, q2, ..., qn) are independent:

qi = Di(pi),

for i = 1, 2, ..., n. The total revenue is

R(q1, ..., qn) = p1(q1)q1 + ... + pn(qn)qn.

The cost of producing these goods is C(q1, ..., qn). The regulator wants to choose outputs so as to maximize consumer surplus,

qi
0
pi(t)dt - C(q1, ..., qn),

subject to the constraint that revenue exactly equals cost (or that profit is a given constant). The first-order conditions are

pi - Ci = (Ri - Ci)

for i = 1,... ,n, where Ci and Ri are the partial derivatives of C and R with respect to qi and is the Lagrangian multiplier on the constraint. This condition may be rewritten as

pi - Ci
----------
pi
= -k
---
i
,

where k = /(1 + ) and i is the elasticity of demand for qi. That is, the price markup over marginal cost, (pi - Ci)/pi, is inversely proportional to the price elasticity of demand for that good. If k = 1, this condition is the standard monopoly price-discrimination condition. If k = 0, this condition is the same as in competition.

© 2000 Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff. Reprinted by permission.





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