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Chapter 20: Regulation and Deregulation |
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for i = 1, 2, ..., n. The total revenue is
The cost of producing these goods is C(q1, ..., qn). The regulator wants to choose outputs so as to maximize consumer surplus,
![]() ![]() | qi 0 | pi(t)dt - C(q1, ..., qn), |
subject to the constraint that revenue exactly equals cost (or that profit is a given constant). The first-order conditions are
(Ri - Ci)
for i = 1,... ,n, where Ci and Ri are the partial derivatives of C and R with respect to qi and
is the Lagrangian multiplier on the constraint. This condition may be rewritten as
| pi - Ci ---------- pi | = - | k --- i | , |
where k =
/(1 +
) and
i is the elasticity of demand for qi. That is, the price markup over marginal cost, (pi - Ci)/pi, is inversely proportional to the price elasticity of demand for that good. If k = 1, this condition is the standard monopoly price-discrimination condition. If k = 0, this condition is the same as in competition.
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